FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CENTRE–STATE RELATIONS IN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.65009/jkx95n11Keywords:
Federalism, Centre–State Relations, Comparative Constitutionalism, Fiscal Federalism, Cooperative Federalism, Judicial Review,,Abstract
Federalism remains one of the most significant constitutional mechanisms for managing
diversity, distributing power, and sustaining democratic governance in large and plural
societies. While the constitutional text defines the formal allocation of authority, the
operational reality of federal systems depends upon political practice, judicial interpretation,
fiscal arrangements, and intergovernmental negotiation. This paper undertakes a comparative
analysis of centre–state relations in India and the United States to examine how federalism
functions in practice rather than merely in theory. The study investigates constitutional
architecture, legislative distribution, fiscal federalism, judicial arbitration, emergency
provisions, and evolving political dynamics. The paper argues that although the United States
represents a “coming together” federation characterized by constitutional symmetry and state
autonomy, and India embodies a “holding together” federation with structural centralization,
both systems demonstrate dynamic federal evolution. Judicial interpretation and fiscal
instruments have significantly reshaped federal balance in both countries. The analysis
concludes that federal resilience depends less on rigid constitutional text and more on
institutional maturity, cooperative political culture, and adaptive governance mechanisms.
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